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Abstract
Dung beetles Onthophagus taurus lay their eggs in brood balls within dung
pats. The dung that is used must be sufficiently fresh, and so beetles must
keep moving from pat to pat to find fresh dung. If another beetle finds a
brood ball it will usually eat the egg inside and lay its own egg in the brood
ball instead of constructing its own ball. Thus beetles will often stay near
their eggs to guard them. We model a population of beetles where the times of
arrival and departure from pats are strategic choices, and investigate optimal
strategies depending upon environmental conditions, which can be reduced
to two key parameters, the cost of brood ball construction and the easiness
of finding balls to parasitise. We predict that beetles should follow one of
three distinct behaviours; stay in patches for only short periods, arrive late
and be purely parasitic, remain in pats for longer periods in order to guard
their brood balls. Under different conditions populations can consist of the
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first of these types only, a combination of the first and second types, or a
combination of all three types.
Keywords: Kleptoparasitism, game theory, Brood parasitism,
1. Introduction1
Kleptoparasitism, the stealing of resources, is a common behaviour in the2
natural world. It has been observed, for example, in wild dogs (Carbone3
et al., 2005), seabirds (Dies and Dies, 2005), insects (Reader, 2003), fish4
(Hamilton and Dill, 2003) and lizards (Cooper and Perez-Mellado, 2003).5
For an excellent review of this behaviour see Iyengar (2008).6
When is it beneficial for animals to engage in kleptoparasitism, and why7
does kleptoparasitism occur in some situations and not others which are8
superficially similar? A series of game theoretical models has investigated9
this question, starting with Broom and Ruxton (1998) (see also Ruxton and10
Broom, 1999; Broom and Ruxton, 2003; Broom et al., 2004; Broom and11
Rychta´rˇ, 2007).12
All of these models are generic, and there have been few models that13
focus on a particular species. One of these was Crowe et al. (2009) which14
modelled the stealing behaviour of the dung beetle Onthophagus taurus.15
O. taurus is a common dung beetle on many continents, originally across16
Southern Europe, North Africa and Asia Minor, being introduced to North17
America and Australia in the twentieth century (Hunt et al., 1999; Fincher18
and Woodruff, 1975). O. taurus have been extensively studied because the19
species exhibits a male dimorphism in the expression of beetle horns (see e.g.20
Moczek, 1996; Emlen and Nijhout, 1999; Moczek and Emlen, 2000; Emlen21
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et al., 2007). Here, we will focus on female behavior. The females of O.22
taurus lay eggs in carefully constructed tunnels under the soil’s surface and23
beneath a dung pat deposited by a large herbivore (Crowe et al., 2009). The24
time that a given dung pat is usable is dependent on climatic conditions,25
particularly temperature and humidity. This time can range from a few26
hours to several days (Moczek et al., 2002). Potential parasities can benefit27
from stealing a ball in two ways. They can gain nourishment by eating the28
egg of the previous owner, and they can save time in preparing their own ball29
by using the existing one for their own egg, if the dung is not too old. It has30
been documented that female dung beetles will routinely access brood balls31
made by other females and replace existing eggs with their own (Moczek and32
Cochrane, 2006). Female dung beetles have been documented to guard their33
brood balls against thieving beetles (Hunt and Simmons, 2002).34
Crowe et al. (2009) modelled this situation as a random process, focusing35
on a population of beetles on a single dung pat. They concluded that in36
general if stealing opportunities presented themselves then they should be37
taken, and that guarding may or may not be the best strategy depending38
upon ecological conditions. However, the model of Crowe et al. (2009) did39
not consider the time aspect at all. Beetles usually use all the dung from40
a dung pat within a period of four days (Bertone et al., 2006), and do not41
spend large periods of time on a single dung pat, but move from pat to pat.42
This is thus a dynamic process, where timing of beetles behavior can be very43
important. In contrast to Crowe et al. (2009), in this paper we model the44
situation where arrival and departure times at given dung pats are strategic45
choices.46
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2. Model47
In this paper we consider a model of dung pats visited by a large (effec-48
tively infinite) population of beetles. It is assumed that it is always in the49
interest of beetles to steal if they get the opportunity (i.e. if they encounter50
the brood ball of a beetle which has already left the pat), but that beetles51
can vary their time of arrival and departure at a pat, and that any particular52
beetle will enter (and leave) a pat when the dung in the pat reaches a cer-53
tain age. The strategies in our model will thus consist of a pair of numbers,54
which are the choice of the age of the dung when a beetle arrives and departs55
a patch. For simplicity we consider only the day of arrival and the day of56
departure, so that strategies are pairs of positive integers, and we assume57
that a beetle must stay at least one day. Whilst this is a simplification, it58
is not an unreasonable one. Beetles need some time (roughly a day on av-59
erage, calculated from results published in Hunt et al., 2002) after laying an60
egg for the subsequent egg to develop to be ready to lay. It is logical that61
during this time the beetle should stay close to the egg (and thus guard it)62
as opposed to going elsewhere. Recent laboratory data (Mary Crowe et al.,63
unpublished manuscript) also suggests that breeding pairs or females remain64
in the proximity of the brood balls for an extended period of time.65
A beetle’s strategy is determined by66
• the age of dung (in days) when it enters a dung pat, x ∈ {1, 2, 3}67
• the age of dung (in days) when it leaves a dung pat, y ∈ {x+ 1, ..., 4}68
We will denote each strategy as (x, y). We thus have six strategies:69
Ω =
{
(1, 2), (1, 3), (1, 4), (2, 3), (2, 4), (3, 4)
}
. (1)
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A dung beetle following strategy (x, y) enters dung of age x. If x = 1, the70
beetle makes her own ball. If x > 1, the beetle searches for any ball it can71
steal. Such balls can come only from beetles that came to the dung earlier72
and left no later than on day x, i.e. only from beetles using a strategy (x′, y′)73
for x′ < y′ ≤ x. If the beetle finds a ball it can steal, it eats the other beetle’s74
egg and lays her own egg in the ball. If no ball is found and the dung is not75
too old (i.e. x < 3, so x = 2), the beetle will work on preparing a brood ball76
of her own. A beetle that prepares its own ball incurs a fitness cost ε (so if77
there is an opportunity to steal it should be taken, as we assume above). In78
any case (for x ≤ 2), the day after the dung beetle enters the dung pat, the79
same dung pat will have age x + 1, a beetle using strategy (x, y) will have80
one ball with an egg of her own; the ball was possibly stolen from a beetle81
using strategy (x′, y′) for x′ < y′ ≤ x. If y = x + 1, the beetle now leaves82
the dung pat to find a dung pat of age x. Otherwise, it stays in the same83
dung pat until it is of age y, guarding her ball and making the ball virtually84
invulnerable to the stealing attempts of other beetles. Beetles coming on day85
3 cannot make their own balls as the dung is too old already. If they do not86
steal the ball, they will have no ball of their own.87
2.1. Model of stealing the ball88
Here we describe the mechanism/ model of how the ball is stolen. Con-89
sider a case where N beetles are trying to steal a ball in a dung pat where90
there are B balls in total. We assume that the beetles are not 100% effective91
in finding the balls and introduce a parameter κ that is related to the success92
rate of kleptoparasitism. During a small period of time dt, each ball could93
be found by N beetles and will thus be stolen with probability κNdt. Hence,94
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κNBdt balls will be stolen in total. Once a beetle steals a ball, it does not95
attempt to steal another one. Hence96
N −B = N0 −B0 (2)
where B0(N0) is the number of balls (beetles) at time 0. Hence, N is the97
solution of the differential equation98
dB
dt
= −κNB = −κB(B +N0 −B0). (3)
The solution of (3) is99
B(t) =

(N0 −B0) · B0
N0eκt(N0−B0) −B0 , B0 6= N0
B0
κtB0 + 1
, B0 = N0.
(4)
Note that the second formula is a limit of the first when B0 − N0 → 0. We100
will thus use the first formula (and approach the appropriate limit where101
necessary). Up to scaling (in κ), we may assume that beetles have time t = 1102
to steal the eggs. Thus after N beetles have come to a dung pat with B103
balls, there will be104
B(1) = (N0 −B0) · B0
N0eκ(N0−B0) −B0 (5)
balls left, while the beetles have stolen105
B0 −B(1) = N0B0 · e
κ(N0−B0) − 1
N0eκ(N0−B0) −B0 (6)
balls in total. Note that the above formulae approach the right numbers in106
the limiting cases, when the numerator and denominator both tend to zero.107
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When κ approaches ∞ (i.e. when beetles are very effective in finding and108
stealing the balls) then109
B(1) ≈
0, N0 ≥ B0B0 −N0, N0 < B0, (7)
which means that the beetles find and steal all the balls (if there are more110
beetles than balls) or that every beetle steals one ball for herself (if there111
are more balls than beetles). Similarly, as B0 approaches ∞ (and κ > 0, i.e.112
there is some chance of stealing), we get113
B(1) ≈ B0 (8)
B0 −B(1) ≈ N0, (9)
which means that every beetle gets to steal a ball for her own egg (while leav-114
ing the total number of balls effectively constant). Finally, as N0 approaches115
∞, we get that B(1) ≈ 0, meaning that beetles find and steal every possible116
egg.117
2.2. Determining Fitness118
We will denote the fitness, or reproductive success, of a strategy (x, y) ∈ Ω119
by fxy. The fitness is the (average) rate at which brood balls produced by120
a beetle using strategy (x, y) reach maturity in a population described by ~P121
minus any costs involved in producing a brood ball. Here ~P = 〈Pω, ω ∈ Ω〉,122
where Pxy is the proportion of the population using strategy (x, y). Evolution123
favours individuals with the greatest fitness, which depends upon the com-124
position of the population. The composition of the population will change125
7
through time according to this fitness, on a timescale that is long in com-126
parison to the three day interactions that we describe. We investigate such127
changes, and in particular look for stable population mixtures, evolutionarily128
stable strategies (ESSs).129
A beetle using strategy (x, y) works for y−x days on provisioning (stealing130
and/or making a brood ball plus potential guarding). This also means that131
beetles using strategy (x, y) can be found in pats that are x, x+ 1, . . . , y− 1132
days old. We assume that dung pats are produced at a constant rate, and133
that the beetles are equally distributed in time and space. Thus, the effective134
number of beetles using strategy (x, y), denoted N exy, that can be found on135
a single dung pat of age between x and y − 1 is136
N exy =
Pxy ·N
y − x . (10)
This yields the formula for fitness of a strategy to be137
fxy =
B3xy
Pxy ·N − ερx,y =
B3xy
N exy · (y − x)
− ερx,y (11)
where Bixy is the number of undamaged brood balls beetles using strategy138
(x, y) have in their possession in a dung pat of age i, and ρx,y is the probability139
that an individual using (x, y) made its own brood ball.140
B3xy is determined by the number of brood balls produced (made or stolen)141
by beetles using strategy (x, y), minus the number of brood balls stolen from142
them. In order to determine B3xy (which is necessary to find fxy) for each143
strategy, we will determine B1xy and B
2
xy.144
Note that we have assumed that there is effectively no cost in searching145
for new cow pats. Field data indicates that the density of pats is over 0.5 pats146
per m2 and that beetles can search over 5m2 per second (Crowe et al., 2009).147
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However, according to Moczek and Cochrane (2006) the time expended on148
tunneling and brood ball production in O. Taurus requires several hours (see149
also Hunt and Simmons, 2002, 2004).150
2.2.1. Day 1151
Only beetles using strategies (1, 2), (1, 3), (1, 4) come on the first day of152
the dung pat. There is nothing to steal and they all make their own balls.153
We thus have154
B1xy =
 N e1y, y ∈ {2, 3, 4}0, otherwise (12)
2.2.2. Day 2155
Strategies (1, 3) and (1, 4) continue to guard their brood balls, so their156
brood balls will not be stolen. The only brood balls that can be stolen come157
from strategy (1, 2); and the only beetles that can steal these balls are using a158
strategy (2, 3) or (2, 4). Hence, there are B112 balls to be stolen by (N
e
23+N
e
24)159
beetles to steal them, we use 5 and get160
B212 = N
e
12 · (1− σ2), (13)
where161
(1− σ2) = (N
e
23 +N
e
24)−N e12
(N e23 +N
e
24)e
κt((Ne23+N
e
24)−Ne12) −N e12
. (14)
Above, σ2 denotes the fraction of the balls that got stolen (using 6). Note162
that (2, 3) and (2, 4) may steal, but those beetles that did not steal can163
make a ball of their own. In total, each such beetle will have a ball in their164
possession. Thus, we get165
B2xy = N
e
xy, x ∈ {1, 2}, y ∈ {3, 4}. (15)
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2.2.3. Day 3166
Strategies (1, 4) and (2, 4) continue to guard their brood balls, so their167
brood balls will not be stolen. The brood balls that can be stolen come from168
strategies (1, 2), (1, 3) and (2, 3); and the only beetles that can steal those169
balls are using a strategy (3, 4). No new balls can be made on day 3. There170
are thus in total171
V3 = B
2
12 +B
2
13 +B
2
23 (16)
vulnerable balls that can be stolen on day 3 by a total of N e34 beetles. Thus,172
by (6), beetles using strategy (3, 4) will steal173
S3 = N
e
34V3 ·
eκ(N
e
34−V3) − 1
N e34e
κ(Ne34−V3) − V3 (17)
balls. Assuming that stolen balls are selected at random, the fraction B212/V3174
of those stolen balls belonged to (1, 2) beetles and similarly for other strate-175
gies. We thus get176
B312 = B
2
12 − S3 ·
B212
V3
= N e12 · (1− σ2) ·
(
1− S3
V3
)
, (18)
B323 = B
2
23 − S3 ·
B223
V3
= N e23 ·
(
1− S3
V3
)
, (19)
B313 = B
2
13 − S3 ·
B213
V3
= N e13 ·
(
1− S3
V3
)
, (20)
B324 = N
e
24, (21)
B314 = N
e
14, (22)
B334 = S3. (23)
The corresponding fitnesses then follow from (11), although this still involves177
the unknown term ρx,y. It turns out from the analysis below that we do not178
need to evaluate ρx,y, but we note here that ρ1,y = 1 for y = 2, 3, 4 and179
ρ3,4 = 0.180
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3. ESS analysis181
First, we establish that none of the strategies (1, 2), (1, 3), (1, 4) can be an182
ESS or even involved in an evolutionarily stable mixture. Indeed, it follows183
from (11), (21) and (22) that, under any circumstances,184
f14 < f24. (24)
Now we compare strategies (1, 3) and (2, 3). Each has the same probability185
of losing any brood ball that they make (if it is stolen by a (3, 4) individual).186
(2, 3) has no greater cost per ball, as (1, 3) can never steal, and (2, 3) makes187
balls at a faster rate than (1, 3) (taking one day instead of two). Thus, as long188
as the expected cost per brood ball is less than the expected reward (which189
we assume, as otherwise the population would not be viable), we have that190
f13 < f23. (25)
Finally, since κ > 0 (i.e. beetles can steal something), we get that σ2 > 0191
and thus since ρ2,3 ≤ ρ1,2 = 1,192
f12 < f23. (26)
This means that we can restrict ourselves to the analysis of the case where193
only (2, 3), (2, 4) and (3, 4) are present. In this situation, beetles using (3, 4)194
can steal balls coming from (2, 3) only and no other stealing takes place.195
Thus (2, 3), (2, 4) must make their own brood balls and ρ2,y = 1 for y = 3, 4.196
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The fitness of the respective beetles becomes197
f24 =
1
2
− ε, (27)
f23 =
N e34 −N e23
N e34e
κ(Ne34−Ne23) −N e23
− ε = P34 − P23
P34eκ
′(P34−P23) − P23 − ε, (28)
f34 =
N e23e
κ(Ne34−Ne23) −N e23
N e34e
κ(Ne34−Ne23) −N e23
=
P23e
κ′(P34−P23) − P23
P34eκ
′(P34−P23) − P23 , (29)
where the new factor κ′ is just a rescaling of the original factor κ,198
κ′ = κN. (30)
3.1. Pure strategies199
We shall first consider each pure strategy in turn, assuming the popu-200
lation consists almost entirely of individuals of that type, together with a201
small invading group comprising individuals from the other types. When the202
population consists of almost all (2, 3) strategists, the fitnesses of the three203
strategies are204
f23 = 1− ε, (31)
f24 = 1/2− ε, (32)
f34 = 1− e−κ′ (33)
so that (2, 3) is an ESS when f23 is the largest of the three fitnesses i.e.205
κ′ < − ln(ε). (34)
When the population consists of almost all (3, 4) strategists, the fitnesses of206
the three strategies are207
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f23 = e
−κ′ − ε, (35)
f24 = 1/2− ε, (36)
f34 = 0. (37)
For (3, 4) to be an ESS we need ε >max(1/2, e−κ
′
). Note that such a popu-208
lation is not realistic, since it consists only of individuals who arrive too late209
to lay their own eggs, and so no eggs are ever laid. Provided that the cost210
of egg laying is not unfeasibly large, then this is not an ESS, and we shall211
discount it. In general we shall assume that ε < 1/2.212
Finally when the population consists of almost all (2, 4) strategists, the213
fitnesses of (2, 4) is f24 = 1/2− ε. It can thus be invaded by (2, 3) strategists214
whose fitness is f23 = 1− ε. Thus, (2, 4) is never an ESS.215
3.2. Mixtures of two pure strategies216
We shall first consider populations consisting of two of the three strate-217
gies only. For any particular mixture to be an ESS, the payoffs to the two218
strategies involved must be equal, and greater than the payoff to the third219
strategy220
First we consider a pair including (2, 3) and (2, 4). We have p34 = 0, so221
that f23 = 1 − ε, f24 = 1/2 − ε. Thus f23 > f24, which means that no such222
mixture can be an ESS.223
Now we consider a pair including (2, 4) and (3, 4). We have p23 = 0, so224
that f24 = 1/2 − ε, f34 = 0. Thus f24 > f34, which means that no such225
mixture can be an ESS.226
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To have a pair including (2, 3) and (3, 4) we need f23 = f34 which, by (27)227
and (28) implies that228
h(P23) = f23 − f34 = (1− P23)− P23e
κ′(1−2P23)
(1− P23)eκ′(1−2P23) − P23 − ε = 0. (38)
For stability against small changes in the relative frequency of the two types229
in the equilibrium we need h′(P23) < 0 where the differentiation is with230
respect to P23. It happens if and only if231
1− e2κ′(1−2P23) + 2κ′(1− 2P23)eκ′(1−2P23) < 0. (39)
It is easy to show that the left hand side of (39) is zero at P23 = 1/2, positive232
when P23 > 1/2 and negative when P23 < 1/2. This, together with the fact233
that h(0) = h(1) = e−κ
′ − ε, in turn means that there are either no roots to234
(38) or there are exactly two, with an unstable root with P23 > 1/2 and a235
stable (against changes in P23 and P34) root with P23 < 1/2. There are two236
such roots when h(0) > 0 > h(1/2) i.e.237
2(1− ε)
1 + ε
< κ′ < − ln(ε). (40)
In addition we need stability against invasion by P24. We will first evalu-238
ate the mean fitness in a mixture satisfying (38). Since pats are visited daily239
by all females, the ratio of the number of brood balls hatching daily to the240
number of females is simply the proportion of females building balls, P23.241
This is also the proportion of females who pay the costs of building a brood242
ball. Hence, f23 = f34 = P23(1− ε). Thus, f23 > f24 = 1/2− ε is equivalent243
to244
P23 >
1− 2ε
2(1− ε) . (41)
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This inequality defines a region in parameter space which has a boundary245
defined by when > is replaced by = in (41). This boundary thus occurs when246
P23 =
1−2ε
2(1−ε) and thus when247
P23
1− P23 = 1− 2ε and 1− 2P23 =
ε
1− ε. (42)
Rearranging (38) gives248
eκ
′(1−2P23) =
1 + P23
1−P23 ε
P23
1−P23 + ε
(43)
which using the rearrangements in (42) leads to the boundary condition as249
κ′ =
1− ε
ε
ln(1 + 2ε). (44)
It is clear that invasion by P24 is resisted if and only if κ
′ lies on one side250
of the critical value given by (44), and simple verification indicates that the251
required condition is252
κ′ <
1− ε
ε
ln(1 + 2ε). (45)
The right-hand term of (45) always lies between the two limits of (40) for253
ε < 0.5 so that we have a pair (2, 3) and (3, 4) if and only if254
2(1− ε)
1 + ε
< κ′ <
1− ε
ε
ln(1 + 2ε). (46)
3.3. Mixtures of all three pure strategies255
For an internal equilibrium we require the fitness of all three strategies256
to be identical. By (27) and (28), f23 = f24 if and only if257
eκ
′(P34−P23) = 2− P23
P34
. (47)
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By (28) and (29), f23 = f34 if and only if258
ε =
P34 − P23eκ′(P34−P23)
P34eκ
′(P34−P23) − P23 . (48)
Substituting (47) into (48) we obtain259
ε =
P34 − P23(2− P23P34 )
P34(2− P23P34 )− P23
=
P34 − P23
2P34
. (49)
Thus we have,260
P23 = P34(1− 2ε), (50)
which substituted into (47) gives261
P34 − P23 = 1
κ′
ln(1 + 2ε). (51)
Rearranging (50) and (51) we obtain an internal equilibrium when262
P23 =
1− 2ε
2κ′ε
ln(1 + 2ε), (52)
P34 =
1
2κ′ε
ln(1 + 2ε), (53)
P24 = 1− P23 − P34 (54)
whenever the three terms are all positive, which (assuming ε < 1/2) occurs263
if and only if264
κ′ >
1− ε
ε
ln(1 + 2ε). (55)
We believe that this equilibrium is also an ESS in all cases, as suggested by265
our numerical results, but we have not been able to prove this.266
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a) b)
c) d)
Figure 1: Diagram of the dynamics for ε = 0.2 and a) κ′ = 1 < 2(1−ε)1+ε , b)
2(1−ε)
1+ε < κ
′ =
1.34 < 1−εε ln(1 + 2ε), c)
1−ε
ε ln(1 + 2ε) < κ
′ = 1.5 < − ln(ε), d) − ln(ε) < κ′ = 3.
3.4. Dynamics267
We consider evolutionary dynamics, using the classical replicator equation268
(Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998)269
d
dt
Pxy = Pxy(fxy − f¯), (56)
where f¯ is the mean payoff in the population. The dynamics yields four270
different outcomes, as in the ESS analysis above, see Figure 1.271
It is hard to prove results regarding the replicator dynamics in a case272
with non-linear payoffs as in this paper, and we shall restrict ourselves to273
observing the outcome of simulations.274
When there was a unique solution, this was either a pure ESS or an275
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Figure 2: Outcomes for different model parameters, the cost of making own ball, ε and
the (scaled) effectiveness to find a ball, κ′.
internal equilibrium, and so in each case a rest point of the dynamics. In276
each case the numerical results showed that this was a global attractor so that277
starting with any population mixture, the population always finished at the278
unique rest point. When there were two rest points, where the population279
finished depended upon the initial population composition, but generally280
each had a substantial basin of attraction.281
4. Results summary282
There are four distinct cases, based upon comparing the value of κ′ with283
three progressively larger functions of ε. We illustrate these in Figure 2.284
If285
κ′ <
2(1− ε)
1 + ε
(57)
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then there is a unique pure (2, 3) ESS which is globally stable. If286
2(1− ε)
1 + ε
< κ′ <
1− ε
ε
ln(1 + 2ε), (58)
then there are two ESSs, a pure (2, 3) ESS and a mixed ESS combining the287
two strategies (2, 3) and (3, 4). If288
1− ε
ε
ln(1 + 2ε) < κ′ < − ln(ε), (59)
then there are again two solutions, a pure (2, 3) ESS and an internal equilib-289
rium combining all three strategies. Finally if290
− ln(ε) < κ′ (60)
there is a unique internal equilibrium.291
We can thus see that when brood balls are difficult to find (when com-292
pared to the cost of production) then all individuals should spend as short a293
time on the dung pat at possible before leaving, and create their own brood294
balls. When they become easier to find, then this strategy remains an ESS,295
but there is also an alternative mixed ESS comprising both individuals of the296
original type and pure parasites which arrive late in the hope of exploiting297
these individuals after they have left by stealing their brood balls. If finding298
brood balls becomes even easier, then whilst the first solution is still an ESS,299
the mixed solution involves a third strategy which arrives early and waits for300
a long time guarding its brood balls as a defence against the late arriving301
parasites. Finally for brood balls that are very easy to find, the pure strategy302
is no longer an ESS, and the mixture of three is the unique solution.303
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5. Discussion304
In this paper we have considered a dynamic model of the creation, par-305
asitism and defence of brood balls by a common species of dung beetle. As306
the quality of dung quickly declines over a small period of days, beetles must307
move between pats to give their offspring a good chance of survival. We have308
shown that under different circumstances, three distinct strategies can sur-309
vive in some combinations. The first type are individuals (2, 3) which arrive310
early on dung pats but leave quickly; whilst they would parasitise others if311
the opportunity arose, they are not on the dung pat at the right time to do312
so. Thus if the population only consists of individuals of this type, there313
is no parasitism. The second type are purely parasitic (3, 4) beetles which314
arrive later, after those of the first type have left, and who parasitise their315
brood balls. Finally there are (2, 4) individuals who arrive early and stay for316
a long time to guard their own eggs from parasitic individuals. The second317
type can clearly only exist if there are individuals of the first type, and the318
defensive strategy of the third type is only effective if the second type are319
present.320
The key factors which affect the mixture of individuals are two key pa-321
rameters, the ease of finding brood balls to steal, and the cost of making your322
own ball. The harder balls are to find, and the lower the cost of making a323
ball, the more the strategy (2, 3) prevails in the population. This strategy is324
always present in some numbers, and for sufficiently low cost of ball making325
and high difficulty of finding difficulty all beetles play this strategy. As these326
parameters change (cost of ball making increases, difficulty of finding a ball327
decreases), then the parasitic individuals can appear, and at more extreme328
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values the individuals that use considerable time resources defending their329
brood balls can appear.330
Our model predicts that very new pats should not be used for brood balls.331
This seems to agree with reality. Crowe et al. (unpublished manuscript)332
conducted an experiment which documented the density of O. taurus beetles333
on dung pats every 12 hrs from creation. Data suggests that dung beetles334
are found in the pat at fairly consistent levels at 12, 24, 36 and 48 hrs but335
after 48hrs there are very few beetles in the pat (probably because the pat is336
relatively dried out at that point). The number of beetles in the soil below337
the pat is significantly lower than the numbers in the pat and that beetles338
do not make their way below the pat until about 24hrs after pat creation.339
The data also indicates that the act of burying dung (to create brood balls)340
does not begin until the pat is at least 12 hrs old. Thus O. taurus likely uses341
different aged pats for different things. Although the density may be high342
in newly created dung pats (12 hrs or less old) the adults are likely to be343
feeding (not all feeding beetles use a dung pat for brood ball production as344
the density of beetles found below a dung pat is significantly lower than the345
number of beetles within the dung pat).346
A key assumption of our model is that all beetles are potential parasites347
and whether they parasitise or not is governed by their arrival and departure348
strategies. In real populations beetles do indeed arrive and depart at very349
different times (Crowe, 2011) and it seems reasonable to assume that they350
would take the opportunity to parasitise if the chance presented itself (Crowe351
et al., 2009).352
Our model predicts that although parasitism is an effective strategy for353
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the beetles to employ, we cannot necessarily expect it to occur at high fre-354
quency or, in some cases, at all. In real populations parasitism generally355
occurs at a low frequency (roughly 13%, Moczek and Cochrane, 2006) which356
might correspond to the type of situation that we predict to occur when balls357
are easy to find (e.g. see Figure 1d).358
We have also assumed that beetles only arrive or leave at discrete times,359
and this is clearly a simplification as in real populations they arrive and de-360
part throughout the day. However, our aim was to make the model tractable361
whilst retaining the key features of beetles being able to arrive or depart at362
early or late times, and stay for short or long periods. Similarly the bee-363
tles search for brood balls is idealized, effectively assuming random searching364
with balls spread evenly across the search area; we again retain the key fea-365
ture of balls being either easy or hard to find. Finally we assumed that dung366
was usable if sufficiently young, and not after a cut-off point. If dung deteri-367
orated in quality, then it may be possible that arrival on the first day could368
be a playable strategy.369
It would be of great interest to obtain realistic estimates of our two key370
parameters ε and κ′ from real populations to see how well our predictions371
match reality. One can extend the model by incorporating another param-372
eter, the effectiveness of guarding (treated as 100% in the current model).373
The parameter may be negatively correlated with the cost of egg produc-374
tion and depend on to what degree a female can guard the brood ball and375
feed simultaneously. Further model developments including using continu-376
ous rather than discrete arrival and departure times, and potentially more377
complex searching strategies for the beetles, would also help improve our378
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understanding of these important and fascinating animals.379
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